260056 Attitudes de se (GradS) (SoSe 2022)

Description: In 1966, Hector-Neri Castañeda made a discovery that has perplexed Philosophers of Mind to this day: In the linguistic expression of attitudes toward oneself (e.g., "He/She thinks, knows, hopes etc., that he (himself)/she (herself) is such and such"), the he himself/she herself locution in such clauses cannot be replaced by demonstratives, names, or descriptions, and, by inference, such de se attitudes cannot be reduced to attitudes de re or de dicto. In treating this problem, Castañeda introduced a new grammatical category of "quasi-indicators" (he*, she*), and, in 1979, John Perry spoke of "essential indexicals". David Lewis, also in 1979, took up the idea, and introduced the now standard terminology of "attitudes de se". In 1981 the problem was then taken up both by Roderick Chisholm, who spoke of the "he himself locution" and by Robert Nozick, who spoke of "reflexive self-reference". The problem has continued to attract the attention of many philosophers, linguists and others. For naturalists, this irreducibility claim is felt a lasting thorn in their side. So, from Lycan and Boër (1975, 1980) to Ruth Millikan (1990) to Cappelen and Dever (2003), they try to reduce attitudes de se to propositional or non-reflexively self-referring statements.

After a preparatory session (1. April, 4-8 pm) in which the seminar’s program will be expounded and the individual presentation tasks will be assigned, we will discuss the problem as thoroughly as possible, without time pressure, in four full-day block sessions during the first two weeks of July, covering as few of the essential texts as possible. A provisional text-collection will be provided in the Lernraum.