260057 Science and Values (S) (SoSe 2022)

In this course, we will look at a broad span of debates on science and values in the philosophy of science literature. We ask: To what extent should science be value-free? Do values undermine scientific objectivity? How to evaluate scientific progress? What role do values legitimately play in scientific research and its application in specific contexts, such as climate change, social wellbeing, and sexism?

We divide our course into two parts. The first part is concerned more with how philosophers of science theorize about the relationship between science and values; the second part examines considerations about values in more specific contexts using various examples of socially relevant science. This course aims to provide each participant with a general understanding of how values have been tackled by philosophers of science.

Bibliography

1. Kuhn, T. S. (1977). Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In “The Essential Tension: University of Chicago Press.”
2. McMullin, E. (1982). Values in Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1982, 3-28.
3. Rooney, P. (1992). On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1992, 13-22.
4. Longino, H. E. (1996). Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy. In L. H. Nelson & J. Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science (pp. 39-58). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
5. Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 559-579.
6. de Melo-Martín, I., & Intemann, K. (2016). The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal. Philosophy of Science, 83(4), 500-520.