996004 Action, Strategy, and Markets (BS) (WiSe 2011/2012)

A key problem in economic sociology is how to conceptualize market transactions in relationship to social action. In recent years, the dominant, relational approach to transactions, also known as the embeddedness argument, has come increasingly under fire on a variety of counts, both theoretical and empirical. It has been argued, among others, that the embeddedness argument does not actually overcome the divide between the economic and the social, and that it does not explain transaction types where (durable) social ties do not seem to play a significant role. Another limiting aspect is the insistence on uncertainty reduction as the foundation of transactions. Growing empirical evidence suggests that market actors do not work toward reducing uncertainty, but toward generating and deploying it as a key strategic element in their transactions.
At the same time, we still lack a convincing alternative to the structural-relational program. Recent efforts deployed under the banners of relational work, of calculative agency, or of performativity are in need of further systematic development, or are marred by conceptual problems of their own. It has been argued for instance that theories of calculative agency, as well as of performativity, while attempting to establish a cognitive approach to markets, completely ignore the role of emotions, or that they are not much more than a revised version of rational choice approaches.
An adequate conceptualization of market transactions in relationship to social action is highly significant not only as a foundation for economic sociology (which has been often accused of lacking a proper one), but also for sociological theory generally speaking. Such a conceptualization would not only connect directly to classic sociological problems (as formulated for instance in the works of Max Weber and Georg Simmel, among others), but should also provide a consistent platform for the analysis of markets as social phenomena sui generis.
The present seminar has at least a double aim: first, to review the contemporary solutions to the duality transactions/ social action, their achievements and limitations. Second, the aim of this seminar is to work out a positive solution to this duality, a solution anchored in a reexamination of the work of Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, and Erving Goffman. Both Max Weber and Georg Simmel took market transactions as paradigmatic for social action, but they didn’t restrict the former to a particular type of action. Moreover, both Schutz and Goffman, independently of each other, did not see action as being primarily geared toward reducing uncertainties. Under certain circumstances, participants in action work toward confronting each other with uncertainties, while the outcome of the entire process is contingent on how such uncertainties are dealt with. This makes room for the concept of strategic action, understood not as the mere application of a pre-set plan, but as the ongoing provision of temporary solutions to the uncertainties of the moment, contingent on the anticipation of next step responses, but also of overall interaction outcomes.
Understanding market transactions depends to a large extent on understanding strategic action as a sui generis type, distinct from practices and routines, but also from distributed and coordinated types. This seminar investigates the strategic action as a possible answer to the dilemmas of the duality transaction/ social action. It draws not only on the abovementioned sociological classics, but also on a broad spectrum of contemporary empirical research. While it stresses interaction, its relevance goes well beyond what is traditionally called microsociology. Understanding forms of market organization, their linkages into domains of social life such as the political or the familial also depends on how transactions are conceptualized.
The seminar is structured in two parts: the first part reviews the dominant concepts in the sociology of markets, while highlighting their analytical potential, together with their limitations. The second part focuses on developing a concept of strategic action in relationship to transactions, as a necessary addition to the theoretical toolkit of market analysis.
The seminar is partly structured as presentation/ lecture and partly as discussion of theoretical texts, as well as of empirical research. While preliminary knowledge of key texts is very helpful, due to the compact nature of the seminar readings will be kept at a manageable level. The aim is not a complete and detailed exegesis of classical texts, but the identification and use of key notions in order to advance conceptual work, while confronting this latter with empirical observations. Therefore, the discussion does not exclusively rely on theoretical interpretations. It will try and develop concepts, as systematically as possible, under an ongoing empirical scrutiny. The emphasis will be put more on classroom and group work. The language of presentations/ discussions is English.

Literaturangaben

Key reading:
Goffman, Erving. 1969. Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press.
Schutz, Alfred and Thomas Luckmann. 2003. Strukturen der Lebenswelt. Konstanz: UVK, pp. 445-587.
Simmel, Georg. 1992. Soziologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 284-382.
Weber, Max. 1972 [1921]. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tuebingen: Mohr, pp. 14-16, 20-26, 35-37, 382-385.